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Abstract
Although many studies find that voting in Africa approximates an ethnic census in that voting is primarily along ethnic lines, hardly any of the studies have
sought to explain ethnic voting following a rational choice framework. Using data
of voter opinions from a survey conducted two weeks before the December 2007
Kenyan elections, we find that the expected benefits associated with a win by
each of the presidential candidates varied significantly across voters from different ethnic groups. We hypothesize that decision to participate in the elections was
influenced by the expected benefits as per the minimax-regret voting model. We
test the predictions of this model using data of voter turnout in the December 2007
elections and find that turnout across ethnic groups varied systematically with expected benefits. The results suggest that individuals participated in the elections
primarily to avoid the maximum regret should a candidate from another ethnic
group win. The results therefore offer credence to the minimax regret model as
proposed by Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974) and refute the Downsian expected utility
model.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: D72
Keywords: Economics of Voting, Voting Paradox, Minimax-regret, Ethnic
Divisions
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Introduction

A well-known prediction of the rational voter hypothesis as formulated by Downs
(1957) and extended by Tullock (1967) and Riker and Ordeshook (1968), is
that, given the extremely low probability that an individual voter brings about
the victory of a candidate or issue, rational self-interested individuals should
not vote.1 However, this outcome contradicts the observed behavior of voters:
many vote even in those elections where the probability of one’s vote being
pivotal is miniscule (that is when the number of voters ”N” is large such that
the probability of a voter being decisive approaches zero). Given that rationality
and self interest assumptions are applicable in political markets as well as in
private markets, this outcome presents a paradox. An interesting focus in the
study of the economics of voting has been an attempt to unravel why rational
people vote when the expected benefits from voting are likely to be much less
than the costs.
Several plausible theories to explain the paradox of voting have been proposed.2 In one such attempt, Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974; 1975), seek to rescue
”rational choice theorists from this embarrassing predicament” and propose an
alternative voting theory whereby the motivation for voting is to minimize possible maximum regret-the minimax-regret strategy. Ferejohn and Fiorina argue
that voters cannot assign probabilities to outcomes under uncertainty. Instead,
they compute regrets (losses) associated with different strategies and choose
the strategy that minimizes maximum possible regret. Thus, in this formulation, the voter is motivated to vote in order to avoid regretting should a less
preferred candidate or issue were to be selected as a result of the voter abstaining. Although the minimax-regret model offers a promising explanation of voter
participation, it has been challenged on theoretical grounds. For example, the
model has been criticized because of its extreme assumption of complete uncertainty concerning probabilities of electoral outcomes. Furthermore, the model
lacks strong empirical support (Blais et al. 1995).
In this paper, we provide evidence that offers credence to the theory of
voting on the basis of minimax-regret. We utilize unique data of opinions by
prospective Kenyan voters obtained through a survey conducted two weeks before the 27 December 2007 elections. The information on voter opinions is
complemented with evidence of actual turnout in the election as reported by
the Kenyan Electoral Commission. By evaluating voter opinions on a number
of issues, we present payoff and regret matrices from which we formulate plausible hypotheses and predictions about voting behavior. Our results suggest that
ethnic voting patterns are to a large extent the outcome of voting on the basis
1 This document is an output from research funding by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) as part of the iiG, a research programme to study how to improve
institutions for pro-poor growth in Africa and South-Asia. The views expressed are not necessarily those of DFID. The authors are grateful to Center for the Study of African Economies for
financial support and to Prof. William Shughart for helpful comments. Kimenyi: University
of Connecticut, USA. Romero: University of Oxford, UK
2 See Dowding (2005) and Geys (2006) for a recent survey of various studies that have
sought to resolve the voting paradox.
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of minimax-regret. In Section II, we provide a brief summary of voter opinions
and also simple payoff and regret matrices followed by some empirical results of
voter turnout. Section V concludes with suggestions for institutional reforms.
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Minimax-Regret and Tribal Voting

The introduction of competitive party politics in Kenya has generally been associated with increased ethnic polarization (Muigai 1995; Oyugi 1997; Kimenyi
1997; Orvis 2001). Of considerable concern is that competitive elections have
been marred by widespread ethnic violence (Kimenyi and Ndung’u 2005). In
December 2007, Kenya held what was probably the most competitive presidential election since independence. The three leading candidates included the
incumbent president Mwai Kibaki (Party of National Unity-PNU), Raila Odinga
(Orange Democratic Movement-ODM), and Kalonzo Musyoka (Orange Democratic Movement-Kenya- ODM-K). 3 As the election date approached, opinion
polls showed that Kibaki and Odinga were in a statistical tie and it was difficult to predict a winner with any degree of certainty. Such a competitive and
peaceful electoral process should foster confidence in the institutions of democracy. Unfortunately, the election process ended up in a dispute followed by
unprecedented levels of violence and displacement of people thereby weakening
the institutions of governance considerably. The analysis in this paper sheds
light on why and how Kenyans voted, and what factors could have triggered
divisions of the electorate and subsequent post-election violence.
About two weeks before the 27 December 2007 general election, researchers
from the University of Oxford, University of Connecticut and Michigan State
University, conducted a survey of voter opinions. The primary purpose of the
survey was to gather information on key factors influencing voter preferences.
The survey collected information on a wide range of voter characteristics and
also opinions about the government, accountability, violence, candidate and
party preferences, etc. The survey sample included 1,207 Kenyans aged 18 and
over from all of the country’s eight provinces, and covering 76 out of 210 electoral
constituencies. The sample is nationally representative and as such captures the
rural-urban split; and the ethnic distribution of the sample respondents mirrors
the ethnic distribution of the national population according to the country’s
latest population Census (see also Bratton and Kimenyi, 2008).
The survey data provide a unique opportunity to explore what motivated
Kenyans to vote and what shaped their voting intentions. To understand voting
intentions we started by asking likely voters to state the main issue motivating
them to select their preferred presidential candidate. As data in Table 1 shows,
90 per cent of the population stated that they would select a candidate based
on the candidate’s track-record of honesty in managing public services and care
for the community. Perhaps, most surprisingly, only less than one per cent of
survey respondents (0.80 percent) stated that the ethnicity of the candidate
3 Although there were several other presidential candidates, only three had national support
and all others were marginal with limited following.
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was the most important factor in shaping their voting motivations. From the
responses to this question we might infer that voters are interested in the quality
of leadership and not on the ethnicity of their leader.
Nevertheless, a different picture emerges when we look at the voting intentions according to voters’ ethnicity. Table 2 presents intentions of voters from
three ethnic groups that also had major presidential candidates. The Table
shows that there is a clear uniform pattern in the voting intentions of each ethnic group. The three main presidential candidates, Kibaki (a Kikuyu), Odinga
(a Luo) and Kalonzo (a Kamba) were overwhelmingly supported by members
of their own ethnic groups. Even voters from other ethnic groups that did not
have a major presidential candidate contending in the elections were strongly
aligned to one of the three main presidential candidates. Thus, on the one hand,
voters indicate that their primary motivation for candidate choice is driven by
policy and the character of the candidate. On the other hand, when asked how
they intend to vote, clear ethnic patterns emerge.

Table 1: Self-Described Voting Motivations
Motivation
Percent
Actually serve the community
27.21
Honesty in handling public funds
24.09
Care about the community
22.12
Experience at managing public services
18.91
Level of education
3.39
Chances of his/her party to win the elections 1.07
Belonging to my ethnic group
0.80
His/her position in a political party
0.80
Others
1.61

Table 2: Voting Intentions by Ethnic Origin
Percent Intending to Vote for Presidential Candidate
Voters Ethnic Kibaki
Odings Musyoka
Group
(Kikuyu) (Luo)
(Kamba)
Kikuyu
88.1
5.8
0.4
Luo
3.4
93.9
0
Kamba
19.6
0.9
73.2

We explore further possible reasons for this apparent contradiction between
stated factors influencing the choice of a candidate and the tendency to vote
along ethnic lines. One possible reason could be that preferences over issues
and policy vary systematically and in distinct ways across ethnic groups. In
other words, the positions of the median ethnic voter vary substantially across
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the various ethnic groups. Another possible explanation might be that there is
low level trust amongst ethnic groups. Lack of trust might motivate voters to
select a candidate from own ethnic group over an otherwise better candidate
just because they may not trust leaders from other ethnic groups. In the survey,
one question sought to investigate social distance between groups by focusing on
expressed trust of members of other ethnic groups. As Table 3 shows, Kenyans
mistrust members of other ethnic groups. Very few respondents indicated that
they trust members outside their own ethnic group a lot. The lack of trust of
people from other ethnic groups is particularly high among those of Kikuyu and
Luo origin. For these two groups, up to 60 percent of the respondents do not
trust at all or trust only a little, people from other ethnic groups.4

Table 3: Ethnicity and Trust
Respondent’s Ethnic
How much do you Trust Kenyans
Group
from other Ethnic Groups?
Not at all Just a little Somewhat A lot
Kikuyu
20.8
42.0
28.8
7.5
Luo
20.3
41.9
30.4
4.7
Kamba
6.2
43.8
44.6
4.5
Luhya
16.3
42.6
28.9
5.8
Kalejin
13.6
45.6
30.1
9.7
mijikenda
2.7
36.0
41.3
13.3
ALL
14.3
42.6
31.9
7.8

Given the apparent extensive lack of trust expressed by respondents, it is
of interest to determine which ethnic groups mistrust each other most and also
to unravel why this might be the case. We do so in an indirect way by asking
respondents whether they feel particularly distant from a specific political party.
Given that political parties are overwhelmingly supported by specific ethnic
groups, assessing whether people feel very distant to a party might tell us which
ethnic groups they do not trust.
The results reported in Table 4 reveal that 40 percent of respondents stated
that they felt very distant from some specific political party. Of the Kikuyus,
over 50 percent felt distant from the ODM (a party supported mainly by Luos,
Kalenjin and Luhyas). Likewise, a similar proportion of Luos stated that they
felt distant from the PNU (a party supported mainly by Kikuyu, Embu and
Merus). The data also show that other ethnic groups felt very distant from the
three main political parties. For instance, the Kambas felt very distant from
the ODM, while the Luhya, Kalenjin and Mijikenda felt very distant from the
PNU. From this evidence we can infer that the high levels of mistrust across
4 Nonetheless, it is important to note that from these responses we cannot infer which
specific ethnic groups they mistrust.
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ethnic groups extend to the political arena. Furthermore, it is possible to infer
which groups mistrust each other most. In this case, it does appear that there
is a very high level of mistrust between the Kikuyus and Luos.

Table 4: Opinions About Political Parties
Respondent’s Ethnic Do you feel very distant from any particular
Group
party and which party is that?
ODM ODM-K PNU NA
Kikuyu
52.7
5.8
2.7
35.4
Luo
3.4
4.1
53.4
36.5
Kamba
30.4
1.8
9.8
58.0
Luhya
12.6
2.6
44.7
36.3
Kalejin
7.8
1.9
41.7
9.7
Mijikenda
5.3
10.7
28.0
50.7
ALL
42.9
6.9
33.0
7.8

To explain why voting behaviour might be influenced by the expressed mistrust of other ethnic groups, we look into some possible sources of mistrust.
During the election campaign, the opposition candidates raised issues of ethnic
favouritism and discrimination by the incumbent government. Such perceptions
could breed mistrust and grievances that may motivate voters to revert to ethnic
voting. In the survey, one question sought to gather information about respondents’ perceptions of how their own ethnic group was treated by the incumbent
government relative to other ethnic groups. Table 5 reports the summary of
the responses by ethnicity The most salient result concerns the responses of the
Luo and Kikuyu. While only 3.1 percent of Kikuyus felt that their group was
treated worse or much worse than others, this figure was 41.9 percent for Luos.
Likewise, while over 20 percent of Kikuyus consider that their group is treated
better or much better, for Luo respondents this figure is only 4.1 percent.
Voter opinions and perceptions are informative in terms of ethnic groups’
expectations. Low trust of members of other ethnic groups implies that it is
unlikely that the majority of voters would trust candidates from other ethnic
groups over a candidate from their own group. Likewise, distance from a particular party also suggests that voters expect to benefit much less were such
party to win the election. Thus, if we focus on Kikuyu and Luo voters, it is
clear that Kikuyus expect much lower benefits from leadership under the ODM,
while Luo voters expect low benefits from leadership under the PNU. In other
words, the opinions convey significant differences in expectations of benefits to
the two groups depending on which party wins. Luos benefit a great deal from
an ODM win and Kikuyus benefit from a PNU win. According to Ferejohn and
Fiorina, it is such expectations of benefits that primarily drive voting on the
basis of minimax-regret.
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Table 5: Opinions about Group Treatment by Government
Respondent’s
Is your Group treatment by Government
Ethnic Group
worse, the same or better?
Much Worse Same Better Much NA
worse
better
Kikuyu
0
3.1
31.4
16.8
4.9
43.8
Luo
10.1
31.8
17.6
2.7
1.4
36.5
Kamba
0.9
10.7
31.2
3.6
0.9
52.7
Luhya
1.1
7.4
21.6
10
1.1
56.8
Kalejin
4.9
7.8
34.0
1.9
0.0
50.5
Mijikenda
2.7
28.0
13.3
5.3
0.0
50.7
ALL
2.6
13.5
25.8
9.1
1.9
46.4
The above conclusion is supported by the opinions of ethnic group treatment
by the government. Here we observe two distinct perceptions about treatment
by incumbent government: perceived preferential treatment (PT) to Kikuyus
and Discriminatory treatment (DT) to Luos. Table 6a and 6b represents the
payoff and regret matrices suggested by these responses. Suppose Odinga were
to win. A Luo voter would expect, first, a gain by elimination of perceived discriminatory treatment (DT). At the same time, it is conceivable that the Luo
voter would also expect a gain of PT (preferential treatment) under Odinga
leadership. On the other hand, a win by Kibaki would result in PT to Kikuyus
while a loss would yield 0 (zero) benefits (equivalent to elimination of the preferential treatment). 5 Table 6b represents the regret matrix. As is evident, the
worst possible outcome for both groups is a win by a candidate from another
ethnic group. Of note also is that, based on the foregoing discussion, the highest
payoff is to Luo voters if Odinga wins followed by Kikuyus voters if Kibaki wins.
This is because the Luos would expect a gain in DT (elimination of perceived
discriminatory treatment) and also a PT (expected preferential treatment) while
Kikuyus would only expect PT (preferential treatment) under a Kibaki regime.

Table 6a: Ethnic Voting Payoff Matrix
Ethnicity of Voter
Presidential Candidate and Group of Origin
Odinga (Luo) wins
Kibaki (Kikuyu) wins
Luo Voter
PT- (-DT) (Positive) DT (Negative)
Kikuyu Voter
0
PT (Positive)
5 We assume that there are no expectations of discrimination against Kikuyus under Odinga
leadership. This might not be the case and it is possible that Kikuyus had expectations of
discrimination if Odinga won. However, we have no information to support such expectations
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Table 6b: Ethnic Voting Regret Matrix
Ethnicity of Voter
Presidential Candidate and Group of origin
Odinga (Luo) wins Kibaki (Kikuyu) wins
Luo Voter
0
(-PT+ DT)(large Positive)
Kikuyu Voter
-PT (Negative)
0

2.1

Simple tests of Minimax-Regret Voting

We now turn to predictions of turnout. In the expected utility model, the
decision to vote is based on net benefits shown as: R = BP-C, where R is the
rewards from voting, B is the difference in utility a voter expects to receive if the
preferred candidate wins, P is the probability that an individual’s vote is decisive
and C is the cost of voting. The key distinction between the Downsian expected
utility model and that of the minimax-regret is that, in the expected utility
maximization model, the value of P and therefore the closeness of an election,
drives turnout. On the other hand, in the minimax-regret model, closeness is
not an important determinant of voting and instead it is the expected benefits
net of costs that determine voter turnout.
(i) Value of P and Turnout in the Kenyan Elections-Constituencies
The predication of the Downsian model is that voter turnout is positively
related to the closeness of the election. On the other hand, voting on minimaxregret does not depend on closeness. Thus, a simple test of how closeness
influenced turnout in the Kenyan elections can reveal which of the two theories
of voting performs better. Using reported data on actual votes cast during the
2007 presidential elections and the number of registered voters across the 209
constituencies that held elections, we compute a measure of closeness using the
percentage gross margin (PGM).6 The gross margin is smaller the closer the
election and larger the larger the difference between the votes cast for winning
candidate and the second most popular candidate. We then estimate a simple regression model with percentage turnout as the dependent variable (TURNOUT)
and percentage gross margin (PGM) as the independent variable.7 We also include the number of registered voters (REG) to capture potential free rider
effects on turnout. According to the expected utility maximization model, we
expect turnout to increase as the gross margin decreases (hence a negative relationship). On the other hand, if voting is on the basis of the minimax-regret,
turnout should decrease as the gross margin decreases (hence a positive relationship). The ordinary least regression results are as follows:
6 There

are 210 parliamentary constituencies but elections in 2 constituencies were nullified.
Gross Margin in a particular constituency is computed by subtracting the
votes cast for the 2nd place candidate from those of the winning candidate and dividing by
total votes cast multiplied by 100.
7 Percentage
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TURNOUT

=

Adj. R-Square

=

TURNOUT

=

Adj.R-Square

=

57.573
(41.88)***
0.375
104.152
(7.19)***
0.407

+

+

0.214 PGM
(11.22)***
0.228 PGM
(11.89)***

- 0.430 Ln REG
(-3.23)***

These results show that turnout is higher in constituencies where the election
is less ”close”, thus supporting voting on the basis of minimax-regret. At least,
even if the results might not be conclusive, we can, with a fair degree of certainty
conclude that voters’ estimation of P did not influence voting at the constituency
level.8
(ii) Expected B and Turnout in the Kenyan Elections by Ethnic
Groups
We have already observed that Kikuyu and Luo voters appear to be the two
groups with the most to gain or lose depending on whether Kibaki or Odinga
were to win. This is conveyed in the information about distance from political
parties and also how the groups perceive their treatment by the government.
Based on the information provided in Tables 4 and 5 and also the regret matrix,
and focusing on the expected benefits, we can predict that turnout should not
only be highest among the Kikuyu and Luo voters, but also that the gross
margins in those constituencies dominated by each of the groups should be high.
This is confirmed in Table 7. Thus, we demonstrate minimax-regret voting by
the existence of both high turnout and high gross margins.

Table 7: Turnout and Gross Margin by Dominant
Ethnic Groups
Ethnic Group Voter Turnout
Gross Margin
Mean Standard Mean Standard
deviation
Deviation
KIKUYU
80.05 6.81
91.35 16.83
LUO
84.06 7.95
98.12 2.19
KAMBA
67.66 8.27
96.51 4.48
64.14 5.40
50.25 21.99
LUHYA
KALEJIN
74.29 11.44
66.11 28.14
MIJIKENDA 54.83 9.57
30.48 18.28

But this conclusion might be challenged on the basis that it is probably
because the leading presidential candidates were from the two groups. However,
8 In an analysis of voter turnout during the 2005 Kenyan constitution referendum, Kimenyi
and Shughart (2008) find similar results.
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looking at voting by Kambas, we notice that the gross margin is even higher
than for the Kikuyus. Nevertheless, turnout was much lower. This is consistent
with the expected benefits- 58 percent of Kambas did not feel distant from any
party and about 30 percent considered the treatment of their group to be the
same as other groups. Turnout by voters from other ethnic groups is consistent
with the expected benefits inferred form Table 4 and 5. Thus, overall, we
can conclude that a primary factor driving Kenyans to the ballot box was the
expected benefits and thus they voted on the basis of minimax-regret.
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Conclusion

This note provides rare evidence of voting behaviour in a developing country
setting. Using survey data on voter opinions and actual voter turnout in the
Kenyan elections, we find evidence that ethnic voting can be explained on the
basis of a minimax-regret strategy. Our survey indicates that there are low levels
of trust amongst ethnic groups, likely fuelled by perceptions that the current
government has favoured certain ethnic groups and discriminated against others.
In addition, voter opinions from the survey suggest that the country is highly
polarized along ethnic lines, a factor which could explain the recent episodes
of ethnic violence. This points to the necessity of constitutional reforms that
devolve power and places sufficient constraints on the executive so as to minimize
the likelihood of ethnic-based discriminatory practices.
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